Sovereignty is defined as the legal equality among states, or as political philosopher Jean Bodin describes, “absolute and perpetual power vested in commonwealth.” Historical implications of sovereignty tell us that the international system is an anarchic being whose major units, states, follow national interest. Yet while following national interest, a balance of power must be maintained for sovereignty to exist.

The greatest challenge to returning Bowe Bergdahl was balancing the national interests of polarized states to uphold the notion of sovereignty. As former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, “diplomacy would be a lot easier if we only had to talk to our friends. But that is not how one makes peace.”

And while we would assume that peace talks would act as a catalyst to the end the war in Afghanistan and return sergeant Bergdahl, they were more of a hindrance. As Serial host Sarah Koenig said, “peace talks—meaning talking directly to the Taliban about ending the war—that was not part of the plan, not yet.”

The only supporter of peace talks with the Taliban was late special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke. SRAP Holbrooke believed that the U.S. military was dominating political strategy in these wars, and he was persistent on changing that. His push for talking with “the enemy” was widely unpopular in the U.S., though the Taliban was looking to initiate these talks.

When speaking with the Taliban these were the United States nonnegotiable demands: the Taliban would stop fighting, break with al-Qaeda, and support the Afghan constitution that included rights for women and girls. As Koenig stated, “The big goal was to get the Taliban to start talking to the Karzai government.”’

And the Taliban had their nonnegotiable demands: to have names removed from the UN sanctions list, to have an established building in Doha, and to return five Taliban members from Guantanamo Bay.

The notion of sovereignty inhibits more established states like the U.S. from infringing on legal equality it shares with Afghanistan. Though in this case, the Talban is not Afghanistan-not a recognized state, therefore, complicating the guidelines of sovereignty. “The United States is trying to make sure everyone abides by the ground rules, including the detail that the Taliban cannot throw around the words Islamic Emirate in connection with this office—very important,” said Koenig.

So how does one execute sovereign practices with non-state actors? This is what the United Sates faced, and possibly what lead to the slow turn over of Abdul Haq Wasiq, Norullah Noori, Mohammad Fazl, Khairullah Khairkhwa, and Mohammad Nabi Omari in exchange for Bowe Bergdahl.

Negotiating these national interests had no simple answer, and on the U.S.’s part, a straightforward “no” to the Taliban was the least bit ideal for effective diplomacy and bringing Bowe home. Yet, anything more than a “no” was what gave rise to the idea that the U.S. government was negotiating with terrorist.

The United States wanted to make it clear that their actions regarding the Taliban were to aid reconciliation. “Going forward, the United States will continue to support an Afghan-led process of reconciliation, which could help secure a hard-earned peace within a sovereign and unified Afghanistan,”-former U.S President Barack Obama