British Defense Minister, Liam Fox, to BBC: “Mission accomplished would mean that the Libyan people [were] free to control their own destiny. It is very clear – the international community wants his regime to end” (Weissman 675).
Taking down Qaddafi became the primary objective of the international community as peace crumbled under his rule. NATO forces and the United Nations Security Council collectively agreed that achieving a stable state meant the transition of Qaddafi out of power.
The Libyan dictator’s descent from power began February 26, 2011 when UN Security Council Resolution 1970 imposed travel bans, asset freezes, and an arms embargo on the Qaddafi family and key government officials (Weissman 672). The Resolution demanded “an immediate end to violence” and “steps to fulfill the legitimate demands of the population.”
However, key actors on the Security Council delayed a direct response to the state of Libya late into the coming of the Arab Spring. Prior, the U.S. and Libya had good relations brought on by Qaddafi’s submission of his weapons of mass destruction and cooperation with anti-terrorist programs (Weissman 671). These relations changed on March 19, 2011 when a NATO-led coalition moved into Libya to enact a second resolution, Resolution 1973. The act by the UN Security Council formed the basis for military intervention that called for an immediate ceasefire.
Resolution 1973 Paragraph 4 10-0
“Authorizes member states to take all necessary measures… to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in (Libya), including Benghazi while excluding a foreign occupation force of any kind.”
At the head of the mission were the United Sates, Great Britain, and France. The three western actors established relations with the National Transition Council in Libya to protect rebels from government air attacks by placing a no fly zone in the region, launching a seven-month air war against the Libyan authority (Weissman 673).
The timing of this intervention has been debated by many, though the significance of the mission is summed up best by French Historian Jean-Christophe Notin. As cited in the Presidential Studies Quarterly, Notin stated, “I initially saw the NATO operation as a continuation of the political effort to start a transition. Qaddafi was unacceptable and about to commit mass murder” (Weissman 676).
In conjunction with NATO and the United Nations other intergovernmental organizations implemented similar policies to address Qaddafi’s crimes against civilians. The African Union called for a ceasefire and created a committee of appointed Presidents and the AU chairperson to facilitate “inclusive dialogue between the warring parties” (Weissman 673).
Libyan struggle under Qaddafi ended on October 20, 2011 after two French Mirage planes and an American Predator drone hit the convoy transporting Qaddafi as he fled the country. He was then murdered by nearby rebels allowing the complete overthrow of the regime. Unfortunately, the end of Qaddafi’s reign over Libya has not fully relieved the nation from its struggle. As we see in present time, Libyans continue to face hardship as the absence of government has fueled even more violence.
Next time…
Weissman, Stephen R. “The Law: Presidential Deception in Foreign Policy Making: Military Intervention in Libya 2011.” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 46, no. 3, Sept. 2016, pp. 669-690. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1111/psq.12294.
